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Preventing Crises in the Post-War Phase:

Engineering Transitional Stility in Palesting

Between International Recognition and Gaza Reconstruction Plans



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Introduction:

After a long and devastating war, Palestine stands at a critical crossroads that demands not only reconstruction but also a fortification of its future. The war has left Gaza in ruins—massive human and material losses, with thousands killed, tens of thousands injured, and widespread destruction of homes and essential infrastructure. Joint assessments by the United Nations, the World Bank, and the European Union estimate material damage in Gaza at around USD 30 billion, alongside USD 19 billion in economic losses due to the near-total halt of production and services. The most severely affected sector was housing (53 percent of total damage), followed by commerce and industry (20 percent), and then critical infrastructure—health, water, and transport—accounting for over 15 percent. Consequently, Gaza's economy has nearly collapsed: prices have risen by more than 300 percent within a year, and the Strip—home to 40 percent of the Palestinian population—now contributes barely 3 percent to the national GDP.

Public institutions, already fragile, have been unable to maintain basic services. Continuous power outages, water disruptions, and loss of connectivity have pushed systems to the brink. Gaza's sole power plant has been completely non-functional since 11 October 2023, while most high-voltage feeder lines from Israel have been destroyed. Residents have been forced to rely on small diesel generators and solar micro-systems—both hindered by fuel shortages and combat damage. According to UN data, large portions of Gaza's water and sanitation systems are out of service, solid waste has accumulated, and the risk of epidemics has grown sharply.

On the institutional and financial front, the Palestinian Authority (PA) remains dependent on clearance revenues—customs and VAT collected by Israel on behalf of the PA—constituting about two-thirds of its budget. These revenues, however, have long served as a political lever for control: Israel has repeatedly withheld or deducted funds to exert pressure. Since October 2023, the far-right Israeli government has escalated this tactic, more than doubling monthly deductions—from roughly ILS 200 million before 2023 to around ILS 460 million per month in 2025—and delaying transfers for months at a time. According to the Palestinian Policy Network (Al-Shabaka), after 7 October 2023 Israel began withholding an additional USD 75 million per month, equivalent to the salaries of Gaza-based civil servants, pushing the PA to the edge of financial collapse. By mid-2025, total withheld or deducted sums since 2019 exceeded USD 1.23 billion, nearly half of the PA's total clearance revenues. This liquidity crisis forced the PA to reduce public salaries, paying on average only 70 percent of wages in early 2025.

Simultaneously, a banking compliance crisis has threatened Palestine's financial system. Israeli correspondent banks warned of cutting ties with Palestinian banks unless new legal guarantee letters were issued to shield them from Israeli and U.S. "anti-terror financing" liabilities. These annual letters—traditionally issued by Israel's finance minister—have safeguarded interbank operations for years. The current Israeli government's hesitation to renew them pre-emptively raised the specter of financial isolation and currency transfer paralysis across both Gaza and the West Bank. In effect, liquidity shortages converged with the risk of financial asphyxiation, deepening the fragility of essential trade and import flows.

Politically and institutionally, the Palestinian landscape remains fragmented and polarized. Since the 2007 split, two de facto governments exist: one in Ramallah under Fatah with international recognition, and another in Gaza under Hamas. This duality has at best weakened coordination and at worst produced competing authorities. The dysfunction was evident after the 2014 war, when Hamas rejected the PA's supervision of reconstruction funds, leading to the creation of the UN-brokered Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM). While GRM succeeded partially in allowing the entry of construction materials, it was criticized for entrenching the blockade's architecture. During the 2023–2025 war, the rift deepened further: economic experts from Gaza described a "severe communication breakdown" between Ramallah and Gaza regarding damage assessments and recovery priorities.

Adding to this, international aid itself has become politicized. The United States and several European countries insisted on ensuring that Hamas would not benefit from reconstruction funds, conditioning disbursement on supervision by the PA or neutral international bodies. Hamas rejected these stipulations as an encroachment on its authority in Gaza. As a result, the reconstruction file rests on a fragile political foundation, threatened by both over-politicization and dual administration, each obstructing swift progress on the ground.

Yet amid this fragility lies an opportunity. Following the ceasefire, international diplomacy has converged on Gaza. The Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit (October 2025)—led by the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey—brought together leaders from 20 countries and yielded commitments for security guarantees and arrangements to reinstate the PA's administrative role in Gaza under international backing. European states also pledged to deploy technical and civil missions—reactivating the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM) and the EUPOL COPPS police training mission—to support local stability.

Concurrently, donors at the Gaza Reconstruction Pledging Conference (held alongside the summit) announced substantial commitments. The United Nations estimated the total cost of recovery and reconstruction in Gaza and the West Bank at USD 53 billion over the next decade, with USD 20 billion required in the first three years—much of which donors pledged to cover. The World Bank subsequently restructured its aid framework—transforming the former Palestinian Recovery and Development Fund (PURSE) into the Palestine Reconstruction and Development Facility—to channel expected inflows to Gaza.

Politically, the year 2025 also witnessed renewed momentum for Palestinian statehood recognition: by the UN General Assembly session that year, 157 countries had officially recognized the State of Palestine. Although such recognition does not alter the legal reality of occupation, it establishes a political and normative foundation upon which provisional or special sovereignty arrangements (financial, banking, and trade) could be negotiated for Palestinians.

In summary, the post-war scene is deeply paradoxical: a humanitarian and structural catastrophe on one side, and unprecedented international momentum on the other. Yet this opportunity could quickly dissipate if reconstruction and stabilization are handled through the same conventional approaches. Experience shows that financial injections alone are insufficient without institutional safeguards and preventive mechanisms. As analyst Omar Shaban observes, donors are increasingly frustrated by Gaza's "destroy-rebuild-destroy" cycle. Many states that spent hundreds of millions after 2009 and 2014 saw their investments obliterated again, eroding both political and financial incentives to help unconditionally. European donors have explicitly demanded guarantees that Gaza "will not be destroyed again after being rebuilt".

These pressures imply that any credible reconstruction framework must embed sustainability and prevention clauses. However, efforts to date still lack an effective bridge between the political track and the operational one: diplomatic recognitions and ceasefire frameworks offer a political umbrella, while donor plans provide financing—but the missing link remains clear operational mechanisms that connect both to on-the-ground infrastructure and institutional needs through a time-bound preventive framework with measurable indicators.

From this standpoint, the purpose of this paper is to fill that gap: to translate political and financial momentum into an operational preventive system that stops crises from recurring. The guiding question is: how can the outcomes of the diplomatic track—international recognition and ceasefire arrangements—be redesigned, together with reconstruction plans, into an integrated transitional protection system that reduces the probability of systemic collapse in a context of limited sovereignty?

Our working hypothesis is that embedding contractually binding preventive tools—linked to automatic activation triggers such as escrow accounts, service-shock insurance, independent digital payment systems, and service contracts for decentralized energy and communication networks—can yield measurable resilience within the first year of implementation. Redirecting part of the pledged funds toward pre-crisis resilience investments (guarantee schemes, escrow facilities, decentralized infrastructure assets) would make future collapses shallower and shorter. This approach builds on comparative lessons and theoretical frameworks such as systems-resilience logic in fragile settings, preventive cost-benefit modeling showing that every dollar invested in prevention saves several in crisis response, and emergency-governance models where exceptional measures are swiftly activated upon predefined indicators.

Conceptual Framework: Prevention as a Form of Possible Sovereignty under Fragility

Our proposed design for a transitional prevention system draws upon a synthesis of concepts and principles from the fields of crisis management, critical infrastructure engineering, and innovative finance. This section outlines the conceptual pillars that inform both our analysis and the design of the preventive instruments.

1. **The Systems Approach:**
   This approach views society, infrastructure, and institutions as an interconnected system characterized by systemic fragility—a vulnerability in which the failure of one component triggers cascading breakdowns across others. In the Palestinian context, the dependence of all essential functions on one another under conditions of occupation amplifies this fragility. For example, a power outage can simultaneously paralyze hospitals, disrupt communications, and halt water distribution, creating security and social instability. Hence, preventive interventions must be systemic, integrating financial, infrastructural, and institutional dimensions to address critical weak points and their interdependencies.

   This logic aligns with the network-based paradigm, which emphasizes distributing risk across decentralized infrastructures to reduce single points of failure. A distributed electrical grid, for instance, is structurally more resilient than a centralized one, since partial functionality can continue even when part of the network fails. This represents a form of structural resilience—the system's ability to continue operating, even at minimal capacity, under extreme stress.

2. **Preventive versus Reactive Resilience:**
   A crucial distinction must be made between proactive resilience—built in advance through prevention—and reactive resilience, which emerges through adaptation during or after crises. The traditional model in Palestine has been reactive: repair follows collapse. Our objective is to shift to a preventive model that anticipates failure before it occurs. Preventive cost–benefit analyses consistently demonstrate that every dollar spent on prevention saves several in crisis response and recovery. Within this paradigm lies the concept of parametric insurance—a pre-agreed mechanism that releases funds automatically when a quantifiable indicator is triggered (for example, when electricity outages exceed a defined number of days or a specific percentage of a facility is destroyed). Applying this model in Gaza would provide automatic liquidity in the wake of shocks, eliminating the political and bureaucratic delays typical of post-crisis aid mobilization.

3. **Emergency Governance:**
   In fragile environments, governance systems must adapt to crisis conditions. Emergency governance refers to the institutional mechanisms that enable rapid, legitimate, and transparent decision-making under extreme stress, circumventing bureaucratic paralysis and political deadlock. Transitional structures with limited mandates and fixed durations—such as reconstruction councils or internationally supervised trust funds—can serve as neutral and rapid operational vehicles. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), for instance, continued functioning under World Bank trusteeship and

international monitoring even amid regime change, allowing salaries for teachers and health workers to be paid through UN channels without implying political recognition of the de facto government. Similarly, the European PEGASE Mechanism in Palestine, established in 2008, has directly channeled donor funds to cover PA salaries and essential service payments, ensuring continuity despite fiscal crises. These precedents underscore the value of semi-independent financial governance mechanisms that maintain service provision regardless of political volatility.

4. **The Theory of Decentralized Networks for Critical Infrastructure:** As an extension of the systems approach, this theory focuses on the technical dimension of resilience—particularly electricity, water, and telecommunications. It posits that decentralized network design enhances durability. In Gaza, prior to the 2023 war, there were early signs of this approach: local and international actors installed solar energy systems on hospital rooftops and water facilities, while the Al-Bureij wastewater treatment plant achieved near self-sufficiency through a hybrid 4-megawatt solar and biogas system. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that integrating solar arrays and battery storage with existing diesel generators enabled hospitals to reduce fuel consumption and sustain operations longer during blockades. The core principle is risk distribution rather than risk concentration—a model that applies equally to communications (using satellite or mobile mesh networks during terrestrial outages) and supply chains (maintaining distributed spare-part stocks instead of a single central warehouse vulnerable to disruption).

5. **Neutrality and Equity as Structural Conditions for Prevention:** Humanitarian governance literature emphasizes that transitional arrangements must uphold neutrality and non-discrimination to secure legitimacy and public acceptance. In Palestine, this principle implies that preventive financial instruments—such as guarantee funds or protected accounts—should operate under a humanitarian–financial memorandum of understanding ensuring that expenditures are strictly limited to civil salaries and essential services, free from political or security manipulation. Likewise, transitional reconstruction bodies must commit to transparency and public accountability, publishing all financial flows and procurement data, and establishing mechanisms for community participation through public complaints platforms and citizen monitoring committees. These practices draw on the concept of an “emergency social contract”, in which maintaining trust through inclusion and information disclosure substitutes for formal democratic accountability during crisis. Research consistently shows that opaque management of donor funds erodes institutional legitimacy and fuels public resentment, while participatory monitoring fosters stability.

In summary, this conceptual framework integrates insights from the economics of conflict (where preventing collapse is cheaper than rebuilding after it), systems engineering (where design reduces structural vulnerabilities), and emergency governance (where transparent, adaptive institutions preserve the social contract under duress). Prevention, in this sense, becomes not merely a technical exercise but a form of possible sovereignty—a pragmatic assertion of agency and protection within the limits of an incomplete state.

International Recognition, Ceasefire Tracks, and Reconstruction Pathways

The post-war period has witnessed an unusual intersection between international diplomatic momentum and the urgent humanitarian and developmental imperatives of Gaza's reconstruction. On one hand, Western countries have taken unprecedented steps toward recognizing the State of Palestine, partly as a moral and political reaction to the devastation in Gaza. On the other, a coordinated U.S.–Arab diplomatic effort has sought to frame reconstruction within a broader political-security roadmap. This section outlines the main political–diplomatic developments and explores how they can be translated into preventive leverage.

1. **International Recognition of the State of Palestine**
   As the Gaza tragedy deepened and its regional repercussions widened, a growing international consensus emerged on the need to offer Palestinians a tangible political horizon. In September 2025, four key Western states—the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Portugal—announced their formal recognition of the State of Palestine within the 1967 borders. This shift is historically significant: it came from countries that had long adopted cautious or conditional stances and was largely interpreted as an expression of frustration with the Gaza war and a desire to revive the two-state solution. These recognitions brought the total number of states acknowledging Palestine to roughly 156–157, joined shortly afterward by others such as France, Luxembourg, and more.
   From a preventive policy perspective, this wave of recognition can yield operational dividends. Bilateral agreements between the newly recognizing states and Palestine could establish special financial or institutional arrangements—for example, a dedicated European correspondent banking network to enable fund transfers to Palestinian banks despite existing sanctions constraints. Another proposal advanced by the PA involves creating an international escrow account for clearance revenues, jointly managed by Palestinian, Israeli, and international signatories—thus preventing unilateral Israeli control over Palestinian public funds.
   A precedent already exists: in 2024, Norway mediated an arrangement to hold large sums of withheld clearance funds in a frozen account during the war, later authorizing the transfer of 1.49 billion shekels to the PA in January 2025 for fuel and electricity payments. This third-party escrow model could evolve into a permanent arrangement with international oversight and legal guarantees, effectively insulating Palestinian fiscal flows from Israeli political manipulation. Notably, Israel itself informally accepted this arrangement to deflect accusations of misappropriating Gaza-bound funds—suggesting

potential openness to its long-term institutionalization, provided oversight mechanisms ensure the funds are used for legitimate service expenditures rather than politically sensitive transfers.

2. **Ceasefire Agreements and the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit Outcomes**
   The October 2025 Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit marked a pivotal step in outlining a transitional governance framework for Gaza. According to official statements, the summit produced a "Comprehensive Plan for Ending the Conflict in Gaza" structured in multiple phases.

    - Phase One involved a full ceasefire under international guarantees and the release of all prisoners and detainees.
    - Phase Two addressed post-war governance, introducing the idea of a "Peace Council" composed of PA representatives, Arab states, and international partners tasked with supervising security and reconstruction during a transitional period. The plan also envisaged the gradual reinstatement of PA personnel and institutions in Gaza, alongside the creation of a new, internationally trained and funded civil police force, potentially supported by the EU's EUPOL COPPS mission.

The UN and EU welcomed this roadmap and pledged full participation, including mobilizing their civilian, technical, and security instruments to support stabilization. The summit's third pillar focused on lifting the blockade and facilitating movement—notably, reopening the Rafah crossing under joint Egyptian–European supervision and increasing movement permits from and to Gaza as confidence-building measures. If codified through clear contractual protocols, these security–political arrangements could serve as core preventive mechanisms. For instance, ensuring sustained international presence at crossings and establishing an emergency protocol to keep them operational even during escalations would significantly reduce the risk of humanitarian and economic paralysis in future crises.

3. **Gaza Reconstruction Plans and Donor Financing**
   In parallel with the political track, a multi-phase reconstruction and development plan for Gaza has been consolidated, anchored in the Initial Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (IRDNA) released in February 2025. The assessment estimated an immediate requirement of USD 20 billion over the first three years to restore essential services, rebuild housing, and rehabilitate core infrastructure. In response, a new international donor coordination mechanism was announced under the joint leadership of the World Bank, the UN, and the EU—described by observers as a "Mini Marshall Plan for Gaza."
   While no single public figure covers the total cost, UN sources estimated overall reconstruction needs at roughly USD 70 billion, with both Arab and Western countries signaling willingness to contribute. However, past experience warns of the implementation gap: after the 2014 Cairo Conference, of USD 5.4 billion pledged, less than half was actually disbursed, largely due to political preconditions and the absence of binding monitoring frameworks. To avoid

repeating this, performance-linked incentives must be embedded in all grant contracts.

For instance, donors could require that at least 15 percent of each reconstruction grant be earmarked for preventive capacity-building within projects—backup energy systems, strategic stockpiles, or emergency response training—and that contractors and sub-grantees be held accountable for compliance. Likewise, funding tranches should be tied to concrete milestones—such as the operationalization of an early warning system or activation of the parametric insurance mechanism proposed later in this paper. Such conditions would transform reconstruction funds from reactive rebuilding resources into resilience investments.

4. **The Persistence of Division and the Risk of Politicization**
   Despite ongoing reconciliation efforts, full coordination between the PA and Hamas remains uncertain. Hamas welcomed international recognitions but called for tangible steps to end the war and halt West Bank annexation, describing political recognition alone as "incomplete without real change on the ground." This signals that internal tension is likely to persist. Realistically, contingency planning must assume that political fragmentation will continue in the near term.
   Therefore, preventive mechanisms must function under division, not depend on unity. For example, escrow accounts and insurance funds can be managed by neutral international or multilateral financial institutions to ensure impartiality and acceptance by both sides. Similarly, a neutral service coordination committee, possibly under UN supervision, could oversee electricity and water management jointly with technical staff from Gaza and the West Bank—mirroring how UNRWA has historically employed local personnel under independent management to maintain operations across divided jurisdictions.

5. **Opportunities and Constraints: A Fragile Window of Possibility**
   Overall, the current political and diplomatic context offers a rare but precarious opportunity. Its promise lies in three elements:
   - an unprecedented international legal and political umbrella legitimizing new Palestinian institutional arrangements (through recognitions and summit resolutions).
   - significant available financing that can be partially redirected toward prevention.
   - multi-actor readiness—from the UN, EU, and key Arab states—to engage constructively in Gaza's stabilization.

Yet its fragility stems from three countervailing risks:

- the persistence of intra-Palestinian fragmentation,
- donor skepticism over the sustainability of investments amid recurring wars, and

- Israeli obstruction, grounded in its rejection of any step implying genuine Palestinian sovereignty.

Indeed, Israel's Prime Minister reiterated that "no Palestinian state will be established west of the Jordan," implying potential obstruction of any framework perceived as state-building. Hence, this paper adopts the notion of "possible sovereignty"—a pragmatic sovereignty rooted not in formal recognition, but in functional control over economic and service systems.

Through the preventive tools proposed in the following sections—financial, infrastructural, and institutional—Palestinians, supported by international partners, can create a stable operational reality on the ground: a sovereignty of functionality and resilience, even under occupation. This is the essence of prevention as both a policy and a quiet act of political assertion.

The Institutional and Preventive Governance Sphere

This sphere focuses on the institutional and administrative dimension of the transitional phase—how to ensure neutrality, efficiency, and accountability in the management of services and reconstruction while embedding mechanisms for early warning and preventive response. It involves the establishment (or reinforcement) of temporary governance structures, backed by data systems and monitoring tools capable of detecting signs of imminent collapse before it occurs.

1. Transitional Authorities with Limited Mandates for Reconstruction and Service Continuity

To avoid rivalry and power struggles between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and *Hamas*—or among any political actors—during reconstruction, the proposal envisions two main temporary structures:

- a Gaza Reconstruction Management Authority (GRMA), and
- an Essential Services Continuity Committee (ESCC).

The Gaza Reconstruction Management Authority (GRMA):

This body would function as a high-level executive unit coordinating all reconstruction and infrastructure projects. It would be established by a presidential decree, with the consensus of political factions, and composed of technical representatives (engineers, planners) from both Gaza and the West Bank, in addition to donor representatives serving as observers. Its mandate would focus on accelerating implementation and eliminating bureaucratic delays through a "one-stop window" with funding agencies. The authority would operate under a time-bound mandate (e.g., three years) and dissolve automatically thereafter, to prevent institutional duplication or conflict with existing ministries.

Its decisions would gain immediate validation by the Palestinian government, while *Hamas*, under post-war arrangements, would commit to facilitating its operations on the ground. A precedent can be drawn from the 2014 National Reconstruction Committee, which, despite being chaired by the then-Prime Minister, lacked empowerment and fell prey to political interference. The proposed GRMA, however, would be legally institutionalized with direct contracting and funding authority, formally linked to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) as the recognized donor coordination platform.

The Essential Services Continuity Committee (ESCC):

This committee would ensure uninterrupted operation of critical facilities, electricity, water, health, and sanitation—throughout the volatile transitional period. It would consist of sectoral directors from Gaza, representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Energy and Water Authorities, and a UN technical advisor to guarantee neutrality. The committee would meet weekly to assess service functionality based on updated risk registers, issuing urgent directives or requests for intervention.

For instance, if hospital fuel reserves drop below 20 percent, the committee would immediately instruct the GRMA or donors to release emergency fuel shipments. If absenteeism in municipal staff increases due to salary disruptions, it would recommend activation of the Municipal Stabilization Fund. The ESCC would thus act as a preventive operations room, detecting service disruptions before they escalate. To ensure authority, it would be formally mandated through a Cabinet decision or presidential decree, with ministries required to implement its decisions even when they involve temporary resource reallocations. The committee would also publish a monthly public report on service conditions and bottlenecks, generating both transparency and public pressure for action.

2. Public Risk Registers and Early Warning Systems

Each vital sector and institution should maintain an Institutional Risk Register, continuously updated to document operational and strategic vulnerabilities. For example, the Ministry of Health might record risks such as shortages of essential drugs, shutdowns of key hospitals, or potential disease outbreaks due to water contamination. Each risk would be assigned a severity level (green–yellow–red) based on quantifiable indicators.

All sectoral registers would feed into a centralized national platform, forming a government-wide dashboard of early warning indicators (KPIs) reflecting the health of the overall system. These could include:

- average monthly electricity outage duration,
- essential drug availability rate,
- wheat and flour stock levels,
- banking liquidity in shekels and U.S. dollars,
- prices of staple foods, and
- public trust in institutions (measured through quarterly rapid polls).

When indicators exceed defined thresholds (e.g., >12 hours of power cuts per day = "red alert"), immediate activation of pre-stored contingency plans would be triggered. Crucially, public disclosure of these metrics would foster transparency and accountability. Publishing the dashboard online and in local media would allow citizens to track government performance, while civil society and journalists could press for timely responses.

The UN has repeatedly called for introducing "shared accountability" standards into Palestinian crisis management. Technology should reinforce this through digital sensors and smart meters in electricity and water networks, transmitting real-time data to the early warning center. For example, smart meters could flag prolonged outages in specific areas, prompting preventive action before public complaints even arise.

3. A Humanitarian–Financial Charter to Protect Essential Expenditures

This Charter of Principles would be a formal agreement between the PA and international donors, codifying a shared understanding that certain categories of public expenditure—civil service salaries, health, education, and municipal services—constitute humanitarian obligations, not political instruments. Under this framework, donors would commit to sustaining these payments during fiscal shortfalls, while the PA would guarantee their continuation even in crises (as it did during the war, paying about 70 percent of salaries).

The Charter would also affirm that imports of essential goods—food, fuel, and medicine—must remain exempt from punitive restrictions, calling on Israel to respect these exemptions under international humanitarian law. While not legally binding, the document would carry strong moral and political weight, particularly if endorsed by a UN resolution.

The goal is to create a "protected fiscal sphere" insulated from political coercion. To operationalize it, a UN-led monitoring team could issue alerts or reports when violations occur—such as salary delays or blocked humanitarian shipments—allowing for unified donor responses. In past crises, some donors withheld payroll support over political concerns; the Charter would redefine such support as a duty, not a discretionary favor. For the Palestinian public, it would signal that basic livelihoods are safeguarded, not negotiable bargaining chips.

4. A Community Accountability Platform: Complaints, Transparency, and Audited Reporting

No preventive governance reform can succeed without public participation. Hence, this paper proposes a digital and physical platform for community oversight comprising three core components:

- **Unified Complaints and Suggestions System:**

  A single channel (mobile app, hotline, and municipal offices) enabling citizens to report service failures, inequitable aid distribution, or corruption in reconstruction projects. Complaints would be compiled in a centralized database within the GRMA or ESCC, categorized, referred to relevant entities, and summarized monthly showing the number of complaints per sector and resolution rates. Public visibility would exert pressure for timely corrective action.

- **Project and Fund Tracking Dashboards:**

  The reconstruction authority should publish all project data—funding sources, contractors, costs, completion percentages, and jobs created—through an open-access online portal. This level of transparency deters corruption and demonstrates credibility. A useful precedent was the donor assistance tracking portal created after the 2014 Cairo Conference (though later neglected).

- **Quarterly Audited Performance Reports:**

  Every major ministry or authority should release a quarterly performance report during the transitional phase, detailing achievements, shortfalls, and justifications. These reports should be followed by public hearings—in the Legislative Council or through civil society invitations—where media and citizens can pose questions. Independent bodies, such as the State Audit Bureau or AMAN Coalition for Integrity, could provide external validation.

Together, these measures would establish a temporary social contract of transparency and participation. In contexts like Gaza and the West Bank—where public trust in government performance has fallen below 30 percent according to recent polls—raising this figure is a preventive goal in itself. A more trusting society is more likely to comply with public directives during crises and less prone to panic or disorder.

Implementing this sphere would build an institutional firewall against administrative vacuum, preserving both legitimacy and fairness during transition. Anticipated results include:

- an increase in public trust by 10–15 percent within a year (as measured by quarterly surveys),
- a decline in service irregularities (e.g., elimination of politically biased electricity or aid distribution), and
- earlier detection of systemic stress, ensuring that service disruptions—like hospital shutdowns—are mitigated before escalation.

Ultimately, preventive governance strengthens internal resilience as a complement to the financial and infrastructural safeguards established in the previous two spheres. Even if external pressures intensify or occupation constraints tighten, a cohesive internal front with rational crisis management can significantly reduce human and institutional losses, demonstrating that sovereignty can begin from within.

5. Meaningful Youth Integration in Post-War Recovery

Youth engagement must move beyond symbolic participation toward explicit executive mandates within the institutional prevention framework. This requires the creation—by ministerial decree—of sectoral youth councils (for energy, water, health, municipalities, and digital payments) with clearly defined responsibilities. Their tasks would include:

- testing minimum-operation solutions for essential facilities.
- proposing improvements to emergency response plans.

- monitoring service quality indicators at the neighborhood and municipal levels.
- feeding monthly data into government performance dashboards.

In parallel, a paid public work program (lasting 6–12 months) would employ recent graduates in rehabilitation and digital transition projects across ministries and municipalities. Tasks would include entering and updating risk registers, operating the citizen complaints platform, and supporting the installation and data management of smart meters. Salaries would be funded through sectoral stabilization components with strong labor protection and professional insurance provisions.

Complementing this, emergency social innovation incubators would be launched to support the rapid development of small-scale, deployable solutions—such as micro household energy networks, mobile communication points, low-cost water meters, or medical stock tracking tools. Outputs from these incubators would be directly linked to relevant service providers for fast-track adoption.

Performance would be measured through quantitative indicators announced in advance, for example:

- achieving at least 30% youth representation in sectoral committees,
- the number of innovative solutions institutionalized within 12 months, and
- the proportion of neighborhoods and municipalities regularly updating service indicators.

A monthly performance summary would link these results to short-term contracts and incentive mechanisms, ensuring both accountability and continuity. In this way, youth engagement becomes a structural pillar of preventive governance—bridging generational renewal with operational resilience.

6. Scheduling and Implementing Elections (Presidential, Legislative, Student, and Union Councils)

Restoring legitimacy and public representation should be treated as a preventive governance measure means to reduce institutional fragility—not as a deferred political luxury. This process can unfold through a multi-track electoral roadmap with defined timelines:

- **Fast Track** (within 6 months):

  Resume student council and professional syndicate elections under a unified Code of Conduct that prohibits political violence, guarantees equal media access, and ensures joint local–international monitoring.

- **Medium Track** (6–12 months):

  Conduct local and municipal elections wherever administrative and security conditions permit, with pre-announced logistical measures for persons with disabilities and displaced populations. Neutral, publicly funded civic awareness campaigns should promote participation and integrity.

- **Long Track** (general elections):

  Set a consensual date for presidential and legislative elections once legal and operational readiness is secured. This should include:

  - updated voter rolls,
  - an independent electoral adjudication system with expedited appeal timelines, and
  - digital publication mechanisms to aggregate and display polling results in real time at the precinct level.

International assistance should focus on logistical and legal guarantees, not political direction. Progress would be tracked through transparent indicators—such as the publication of the electoral timeline, voter turnout rates, number of appeals resolved within statutory deadlines, and mapping of administrative gaps.

By embedding the electoral process within the logic of preventive governance, elections become more than a democratic event—they evolve into a confidence-building mechanism, strengthening public trust, institutional compliance, and social discipline during the transition toward stability.

Conclusion

The recent war in Gaza marks a profound turning point—one that has generated exceptional political and financial solidarity with the Palestinians yet also exposed a hard truth: ending the war and injecting funds are not enough to prevent its recurrence or the repetition of its human and structural consequences. For two decades, Gaza has cycled through destruction and reconstruction, with the international community repeatedly arriving too late to repair what was broken—without ever erecting safeguards to prevent the next catastrophe. Shifting from this reactive pattern to a proactive, preventive model is not a luxury or an academic proposition; it is a moral, political, and economic necessity.

It is a moral necessity toward more than two million people in Gaza who deserve to live with a basic sense of security rather than the expectation of collapse every few years; a political necessity to revive the two-state framework by proving that Palestinians can govern themselves effectively, even under extreme constraint; and an economic necessity to maximize the impact of every dollar spent—by transforming it from post-crisis repair into pre-crisis resilience, reducing future losses before they occur.

This paper has presented a comprehensive operational blueprint for how international recognition, diplomatic momentum, and donor resources can be harnessed to build protective layers above, beneath, and around Palestinian society. The vision resembles the construction of a multi-layered protective dome:

- a financial dome to prevent the economy from freefall,
- an infrastructural dome to shield essential services from total collapse, and

- an institutional dome to ensure continuity of governance—even in the absence or fragmentation of political leadership.

Together, these layers constitute new forms of sovereignty: sovereignty over financial decisions, over the management of vital resources, and over public trust through transparency and accountability. This is what we define as "possible sovereignty"—a sovereignty that Palestinians and their allies can enact, not just imagine, even amid ongoing occupation. Paradoxical as it may sound, the exercise of such limited sovereignty is precisely what generates hope and agency, shaping a better interim reality while awaiting a comprehensive and just resolution.

Implementing this model will not be without resistance. Israel may seek to obstruct or dilute it if perceived as undermining its dominance; however, the international willpower displayed through recent recognitions and summits can serve as a deterrent—if maintained in unified form. Similarly, some Palestinian factions may hesitate to embrace new, unfamiliar mechanisms out of concern for short-term political interests. Yet, their national responsibility demands prioritizing collective long-term resilience over internal competition—particularly as these measures can strengthen, not weaken, public legitimacy.

Within the current catastrophe lie the seeds of a more rational, humane paradigm—one that treats prevention as an intrinsic component of reconstruction and peacebuilding. No society should be left at the mercy of recurring shocks. Just as pandemics and environmental disasters have transformed global thinking toward preparedness and resilience, Gaza's tragedy can—and should—serve as a wake-up call, urging a fundamental rethinking of how the world supports crisis-affected regions: from rebuilding after collapse to building so that collapse never happens again.