{"id":12409,"date":"2024-07-09T14:15:01","date_gmt":"2024-07-09T11:15:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/?p=12409"},"modified":"2025-07-09T14:19:17","modified_gmt":"2025-07-09T11:19:17","slug":"rebuilding-gaza-considerations-for-a-habitable-futusre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2024\/07\/12409\/","title":{"rendered":"Rebuilding Gaza: Considerations for a Habitable Futusre"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Omar Shaban<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Israel\u2019s assault on Gaza has raged on for over seven months, with no end yet in sight. Undoubtedly, the genocide has had a global impact\u2014from Houthi mobilization<\/a> in the Red Sea, to rising tensions<\/a> between Israel and Iran, to mass student mobilization<\/a> across the US and Europe. Still, while the world\u2019s attention may be on Palestine more so than in generations past, it comes at a shattering cost. Indeed, the sheer numbers of fatalities (estimated now at over 35,000), those displaced, and homes destroyed can\u2019t do justice to the level of devastation that Gaza has shouldered since October, 2023.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even so, it remains necessary for Palestinians to lead the conversation on what comes after Israel\u2019s genocide. To opt out of these discussions is to leave our collective future in the hands of the very people who have sought for decades to erase us. Accordingly, this commentary offers an entry point to a Palestinian dialogue on what may follow after a ceasefire is reached. It does so by delving into the current non-Palestinian \u201cday after\u201d discourse, then by identifying the ways in which today\u2019s reconstruction effort is distinct from those of the past, and finally by putting forth a possible approach to begin to embark on such a project.      <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Palestinian Exclusion in the \u201cDay After\u201d Discourse <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Since the start of Israel\u2019s genocidal assault on Gaza, countless debates, briefings, and think pieces have put forth various proposals for what the day after<\/em> may look like. The vast majority of these discussions have, at best, featured some tokenistic Palestinian participation. More commonly, they have taken place without the inclusion of Palestinians altogether. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, in an opinion piece for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Leon Hadar calls<\/a> for rethinking Palestinian statehood as a long-term goal rather than an immediate policy proposal, instead suggesting that the deployment of NATO forces in Gaza or continued Israeli military occupation remain logical options in the short term. In another instance, a joint project between the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) and The Vandenberg Coalition advocates for the creation of the International Trust for Gaza Relief and Reconstruction. In its proposal<\/a>, the eight-member project committee describes the trust as a \u201csuper-NGO\u201d to be steered by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Chatham House also released a \u201cday after\u201d piece, authored by Sanlam Vakil and Neil Quilliam, which likewise implores Gulf states<\/a> to take a more proactive role in post-ceasefire planning as well as support for Palestinian statehood efforts. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Importantly, none of these proposals centered Palestinian voices\u2014neither as authors nor as expert sources. This exclusionary analysis that favors non-Palestinian insights over Palestinian expertise and lived experience is not unusual. Rather, it is part of a long-held trend to preclude Palestinian autonomy and self-determination in the context of policy planning. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The plethora of \u201cday after\u201d analysis comes as it is made increasingly clear that the Israeli regime embarked on its assault on Gaza with the singular goal of eradicating Hamas, and without any plan for what comes next. The past several months, in particular, suggest that even this objective is in flux for Israel, as its military continues to carry out widespread indiscriminate massacres<\/a> and destruction across much of Gaza. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Netanyahu has ruled out<\/a> the possibility of the Palestinian Authority (PA) governing Gaza once a ceasefire is reached, Biden has advocated<\/a> for that very option. In a move to regain some legitimacy among global partners, PA President Mahmoud Abbas recently put together a new technocratic government<\/a>. Still, it remains to be seen how the \u201crevitalized\u201d PA will be received by Israeli policymakers\u2014let alone by the Palestinian people, who have yet to have elections since 2006. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Obstacles to Reconstruction<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Gaza has already faced the devastating project of reconstruction<\/a> on several occasions, and many aspects of the previous initiatives failed completely<\/a>. Still, the current context presents even greater challenges than before. Below are merely a few of the multitude of considerations that must be made when accounting for what it will take to rebuild Gaza:<\/p>\n\n\n\n