{"id":7602,"date":"2014-07-21T09:24:25","date_gmt":"2014-07-21T06:24:25","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/?p=7602"},"modified":"2014-07-21T09:24:25","modified_gmt":"2014-07-21T06:24:25","slug":"the-gaza-crisis-timing-a-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/","title":{"rendered":"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Gaza-12\"<\/a><\/p>\n

BY OMAR SHABAN<\/p>\n

\"Fair\u00a0The Gaza crisis may provide opportunities for political players, but victims on both sides are paying the price.<\/p>\n

Israel has launched three wars in under six years. This is what the blockaded Gaza Strip has been subjected to since Hamas took over in June 2007. The stated objective of the two previous wars \u2014 Operations Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense in 2008-09 and 2012, respectively \u2014 was to destroy underground tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. According Israel, tunnels were used to smuggle weapons for Hamas and other Palestinian resistance movements in Gaza. However, both conflicts failed to destroy the tunnels until the new Egyptian regime came to power after July 3, 2013, when President Mohammed Morsi was ousted by the military.<\/p>\n

Since then, President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, the former Egyptian general, has pursued an aggressive campaign, which has succeeded in destroying 90% of tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. For Hamas members, Cairo\u2019s actions have made it unsafe to smuggle anything underground. As a result, Hamas has been unable to pay the salaries of its 40,000 employees for the past seven months \u2014 the government faction\u2019s budget for 2014 reached $894 million. Since then, Hamas has found itself in an unprecedented situation.<\/p>\n

Hamas\u2019 problems began with the removal of Morsi, who was supportive of the Palestinian faction as it is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. The new Egyptian regime under Sisi destroyed the tunnels, which were considered to be Hamas\u2019 main source of income, weapons and aid assistance; they also provided free access for its members to travel outside Gaza. Following Morsi\u2019s ouster, Hamas lost a key supporter of its government, as well as regional backing and access to aid convoys.<\/p>\n

However, within this context, we can assess that, despite the instability and destruction, the Israeli government\u2019s \u201cOperation Protective Edge\u201d may actually come as an opportunity for both Israel and Hamas, but for different reasons.<\/p>\n

The Right Time for Israel<\/p>\n

Israel has, in the strongest terms, condemned the latest reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah \u2014 the latter being the main faction in the Palestinian Authority (PA). Regarding the establishment of a Palestinian national unity government, Israel has declared its opposition several times by rejecting the normalization of ties between the two warring factions. Consequently, Israel prevented Gaza-based ministers from traveling to the West Bank, making any unity government unsustainable.<\/p>\n

With this in mind, Israel found that the time was right to wage a third war against Hamas. Tel Aviv realizes that Hamas is stuck in a crisis due to Egypt\u2019s policies and the lack of regional support. Hence, it was interpreted to be the best time to enter a conflict without triggering strong reactions from neighboring Arab states. Syria, busy with its civil war, has maintained its distance from Hamas since the flight of its leadership from Damascus. Iran and Hezbollah, while maintaining their official commitment to the Palestinian cause, have also been embroiled in Syria conflict.<\/p>\n

Knowing the strategy of Hamas when it finds itself in a crisis, the faction has nothing to lose by engaging in a war with Israel. Although Hamas was not interested in another confrontation in principle, the unbearable circumstances have left few options on the table.<\/p>\n

According to Israel\u2019s assessments, the timing was ripe for war on Gaza and Hamas for two reasons. First, the Israeli government seeks to reverse the latest reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas, as both factions moved to form a technocratic government. Second, Israel\u2019s aim is to decrease the military capacity of Hamas, knowing full-well that it will not be able to replenish weapons due to Egypt\u2019s destruction of tunnels.<\/p>\n

However, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his government expected an easy victory, assuming that Hamas would easily give in amid aerial bombardment and a ground offensive \u2014 the latter of which began late on July 17. Instead, Hamas has showed a far greater amount of resilience by maintaining a steady flow of rockets.<\/p>\n

And the Right Time for Hamas<\/p>\n

Since Sisi\u2019s rise in Egypt, the military wing of Hamas, the Qassam Brigades, has become the real ruler in Gaza. Although the political wing continues to make appearances, it has less influence than before. Over the past few years, there have been several indicators that prove the gap between the political and military wings has been increasing. The faction\u2019s military wing has been unsatisfied with the performance of the Hamas government, especially during the reconciliation process with Mahmoud Abbas\u2019 Fatah. The political leadership of Hamas is perceived as having failed to achieve any concrete results or benefits. Due to this, the group\u2019s military wing believes the political leadership \u201csold\u201d its members cheaply.<\/p>\n

Knowing the strategy of Hamas when it finds itself in a crisis, the faction has nothing to lose by engaging in a war with Israel. Although Hamas was not interested in another confrontation in principle, the unbearable circumstances have left few options on the table. There is no money for government employee salaries; the reconciliation with Fatah has been untenable under the current situation; border crossings have remained closed; the siege of Gaza has persisted since 2007; and Israel has conducted a concerted campaign against Hamas supporters in the West Bank, and arrested its Palestinian Legislative Council members.<\/p>\n

Amid these developments, the military wing has been left with no option other than to confront Israel, in hope it would prove the following:<\/p>\n

1) Hamas is still strong and can destabilize the \u201cstatus quo\u201d<\/p>\n

2) Hamas is still a key player and Israel will need to take its demands seriously<\/p>\n

3) The PA and President Abbas maintain a security alliance with Israel, while Hamas focuses on the path of Palestinian resistance<\/p>\n

4) There is a need to update and refresh the ceasefire agreement, which was signed in Cairo in 2012 under the mediation of Morsi<\/p>\n

By brokering a new agreement with President Sisi, Hamas would compel the new leadership in Egypt to recognize the faction and, possibly, allow for it to maintain its clout in regional politics. Israel\u2019s offensive on Gaza will provide better opportunities for all regional parties to reposition themselves \u2014 apart from the victims on both sides, who must bear the brunt of ceaseless violence.<\/p>\n

Source: http:\/\/www.fairobserver.com\/region\/middle_east_north_africa\/the-gaza-crisis-timing-a-war-00357\/<\/a><\/p>\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

BY OMAR SHABAN \u00a0The Gaza crisis may provide opportunities for political players, but victims on both sides are paying the price. Israel has launched three wars in under six years. This is what the blockaded Gaza Strip has been subjected to since Hamas took over in June 2007. The stated objective of the two previous […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":7603,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[61],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7602","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Gaza Crisis: Timing a War - Pal-Think For Strategic Studies<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War - Pal-Think For Strategic Studies\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"BY OMAR SHABAN \u00a0The Gaza crisis may provide opportunities for political players, but victims on both sides are paying the price. Israel has launched three wars in under six years. This is what the blockaded Gaza Strip has been subjected to since Hamas took over in June 2007. The stated objective of the two previous […]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:author\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2014-07-21T06:24:25+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"938\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"450\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"PalThink Editor\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@https:\/\/twitter.com\/palthink\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"PalThink Editor\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"PalThink Editor\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/6d4089d136a0f743eb8aca41a34d0d96\"},\"headline\":\"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War\",\"datePublished\":\"2014-07-21T06:24:25+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/\"},\"wordCount\":1042,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg\",\"articleSection\":[\"Articles and Studies\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/\",\"name\":\"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War - Pal-Think For Strategic Studies\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2014-07-21T06:24:25+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg\",\"width\":938,\"height\":450},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/\",\"name\":\"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies\",\"description\":\"\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1.jpg\",\"width\":200,\"height\":111,\"caption\":\"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/6d4089d136a0f743eb8aca41a34d0d96\",\"name\":\"PalThink Editor\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1-150x111.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1-150x111.jpg\",\"caption\":\"PalThink Editor\"},\"description\":\"PALThink for Strategic Studies is an independent non-profit, non-political, non-governmental and non-sectarian think and do tank that aims to stimulate and inspire rational public discussions and consensus for the well-being of the Palestinians and the Region.\",\"sameAs\":[\"http:\/\/palthink.org\",\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink\/\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/https:\/\/twitter.com\/palthink\",\"https:\/\/youtube.com\/user\/palthink\"],\"url\":\"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/author\/admin\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War - Pal-Think For Strategic Studies","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War - Pal-Think For Strategic Studies","og_description":"BY OMAR SHABAN \u00a0The Gaza crisis may provide opportunities for political players, but victims on both sides are paying the price. Israel has launched three wars in under six years. This is what the blockaded Gaza Strip has been subjected to since Hamas took over in June 2007. The stated objective of the two previous […]","og_url":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/","og_site_name":"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink","article_author":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink\/","article_published_time":"2014-07-21T06:24:25+00:00","og_image":[{"width":938,"height":450,"url":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"PalThink Editor","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@https:\/\/twitter.com\/palthink","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"PalThink Editor","Est. reading time":"5 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/"},"author":{"name":"PalThink Editor","@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/6d4089d136a0f743eb8aca41a34d0d96"},"headline":"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War","datePublished":"2014-07-21T06:24:25+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/"},"wordCount":1042,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg","articleSection":["Articles and Studies"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/","url":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/","name":"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War - Pal-Think For Strategic Studies","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg","datePublished":"2014-07-21T06:24:25+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/07\/Gaza-12.jpg","width":938,"height":450},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/2014\/07\/7602\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The Gaza Crisis: Timing a War"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#website","url":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/","name":"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies","description":"","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#organization","name":"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies","url":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1.jpg","contentUrl":"http:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1.jpg","width":200,"height":111,"caption":"Pal-Think For Strategic Studies"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/6d4089d136a0f743eb8aca41a34d0d96","name":"PalThink Editor","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1-150x111.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/01\/PALTHINK-LOGO-EN1-150x111.jpg","caption":"PalThink Editor"},"description":"PALThink for Strategic Studies is an independent non-profit, non-political, non-governmental and non-sectarian think and do tank that aims to stimulate and inspire rational public discussions and consensus for the well-being of the Palestinians and the Region.","sameAs":["http:\/\/palthink.org","https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Palthink\/","https:\/\/x.com\/https:\/\/twitter.com\/palthink","https:\/\/youtube.com\/user\/palthink"],"url":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/author\/admin\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7602","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7602"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7602\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7603"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7602"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7602"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/palthink.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7602"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}